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Abstract
The WHO announced the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) movement in 1998, with the goal of halving
malaria deaths by 2010, and halving again by 2015. It is widely agreed that reaching this goal requires
a major increase in international aid funding for malaria control, to a budget of perhaps $1.5 – $2.5
billion annually. To ascertain whether progress is being made, we compiled data self-reported by
the donors to the Development Assistance Committee of OECD, and also to ourselves directly.
We find that, in fact, the total amount of international aid dedicated to malaria control, from the
23 richest donor countries plus the World Bank, remains in the range of $100 million annually – a
figure that is virtually unchanged since the start of RBM. This lack of progress toward increasing
funding very seriously threatens RBM and demands that WHO regularly audit and report on
malaria control funding, with the certainty that RBM will fail to meet its deadline of 2010 if this is
not done.
In 1998, the WHO, World Bank, UNDP and UNICEF con-
ceived and partnered to create the Roll Back Malaria
movement, with the welcome and necessary goal of halv-
ing malaria deaths by 2010 – the first major effort against
the disease in four decades [1,2]. The need for such an
effort is abundantly clear: malaria places a huge burden
on Sub-Saharan Africa, with 300 million people suffering
acute illness each year, and one million dying, at least
70% of whom are children or pregnant women. In coun-
tries with a heavy malaria burden, the disease accounts for
as much as 40% of public health expenditure, 30–50% of
inpatient admissions, and up to 50% of outpatient visits
[3]. Those children who do not die can suffer brain dam-
age or experience cognitive and learning deficiencies [4].
These events of illness and childhood retardation are so
common in the tropics that entire countries fail to develop
economically, cementing a future of desperation and pov-
erty that spans generations [5]. Only the HIV/AIDS pan-
demic among infectious diseases is more deadly [6].
Roll Back Malaria was, therefore, called into being to pro-
mote an effective control strategy to combat the disease.
This emphasizes rapid clinical case detection and treat-
ment, use of insecticide treated bednets, management of
malaria during pregnancy, and focal control of malaria
transmission in emergency or epidemic situations. RBM's
ambition is to expand the use of these interventions in all
countries where malaria is endemic, but especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, where 90% of malaria deaths occur [7].
However, making malaria control operate on large scale
requires money – far more money than African countries
can afford, but not so much by the standards of the rich
countries that donate international aid. A declaration
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signed by over 20 African Heads of State in Abuja, Nigeria
in April 2000 pledges African commitment to malaria
control and calls on international aid donors to furnish
"substantial new resources of at least $1 billion per year to
Roll Back Malaria" [8]. This political declaration appears
to be a modest underestimate of what the actual needs
would be: researchers estimate that by 2007, a scaled-up
effort of malaria control would cost from $1.5 – $2.5 bil-
lion annually worldwide, of which $0.5 – $1.1 billion is
needed just in sub-Saharan Africa [9].
The trouble is, such sums far exceed the available interna-
tional aid finance for malaria control. An extensive survey
by the London-based Malaria Consortium concluded that
the total amount of public aid for malaria research and
control was only $100 million in 1998 [10]. This figure is
not far from the estimate of the WHO Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health, which estimates that inter-
national aid for malaria control averaged about $87 mil-
lion annually in the late 1990s [11].
Consequently, by the late 1990s, the actual levels of inter-
national aid for malaria control were at least an order of
magnitude less that what all agree is necessary to achieve
RBM's goal of halving malaria deaths by 2010. We, there-
fore, set out in this paper to assess whether, since the start
of RBM in 1998, these international aid levels have
increased to approach the several billion dollars a year
that are needed worldwide. One would hypothesize that
this should be true: RBM was conceived by the interna-
tional aid donors themselves, who collectively lead this
effort as "RBM Partners", with the help of a small secretar-
iat based at the WHO. The current list of RBM Partners
includes four major United Nations agencies (WHO, the
World Bank, UNDP and UNICEF), plus most of the
national aid agencies of the wealthy, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries [12]. Yet, despite this assembly of agencies, as we
show in this cross-sectional survey, the necessary increases
in funding are not happening as promised, with serious
results.
Reporting methods
The major donors of official development assistance
(ODA) for malaria control are the 23 national aid agen-
cies of the OECD Development Assistance Committee
(DAC), which comprises the wealthy governments of the
Asia Pacific, North America, and Western Europe (includ-
ing the European Commission). These donors provide
either direct bilateral funding (country-to-country), or
multilateral funding through agencies such as the World
Bank (agency-to-country), and as such, they represent
close to the total amount of public money that exists for
malaria control in the world. Additional funds may be
given by private charities, such as the Gates Foundation or
the Wellcome Trust, but as non-governmental funders
they are not considered in this study.
We assessed ODA amounts in two stages. First, we used
the official statistical database of the OECD DAC, known
as the Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which compiles
all funding commitments by donor country, purpose,
recipient country, and whether the type of funding is a
grant or loan. Importantly, these CRS data are self-
reported by the donors themselves, and are, for that rea-
son, presumably accurate. However, the accounting meth-
ods of the CRS make it difficult to precisely separate and
discern malaria control funding discretely. We, therefore,
performed a second stage of inquiry to verify and refine
the CRS-based data, in which we asked each donor to
complete a written survey disclosing their malaria control
financing and projects. Results of both research stages are
reported here.
CRS Data
The DAC donors supported health projects totalling
approximately $3 billion in 2000, the most recent year for
which data are available [13]. This sum comprises many
individual projects, each of which is catalogued in the CRS
database under a category and standardized 5-digit "pur-
pose code" [14]. Although the CRS has no discrete cate-
gory and purpose code for malaria the way it does for
HIV/AIDS (which is a major and problematic omission),
selecting the malaria control projects is still possible by
screening the individual project titles and descriptions
which donors self-reported to the database.
We screened six categories and purpose codes in the CRS
database, to identify new malaria control projects funded
by the DAC donors, UNDP, or UNICEF in 2000 (Table 1).
We generously assumed that a project could be related to
malaria control if its title or description referred to: (i)
malaria; (ii) an anti-malaria intervention; (iii) unspecified
"infectious disease control" without specific reference to
malaria; or the appropriate foreign language equivalents
for any of these (e.g. "paludisme", the French for malaria).
This procedure selected 83 projects, which is a crude esti-
mate of the number of new malaria control projects in
2000. Two degrees of uncertainty are associated with this
project selection. First, because the CRS database is cross-
sectional, we include only funding commitments as they
occurred in 2000 (e.g. a funding commitment occurring
in 1999 but spent in 2000 is excluded) [15]. Second,
because the screening method is necessarily subjective, we
purposefully erred on the side of inclusiveness and con-
servatism, counting projects even if their connection to
malaria control was questionable. For example, we
include several American projects whose short description
in the CRS database is "malaria", but with incongruous-Malaria Journal 2003, 2 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/2/1/8
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seeming titles (e.g. "rapid increase of HIV/AIDS
prevented").
Beyond project selection, however, there are three smaller
sources of uncertainty in the CRS data. First, there may be
instances where donors simply erred in reporting their
project data to the CRS, leading us to misstate their contri-
bution (e.g. a Canadian project recorded under CRS pur-
pose code 12250, but valued at zero dollars). Second, the
CRS data report donor commitments, not actual
disbursements, which are less owing to planned disburse-
ment delays, or unplanned cancellations. Taking commit-
ments as a proxy for actual disbursements leads us to
overestimate the amount of international aid that devel-
oping countries actually receive from aid donors, perhaps
greatly so (e.g. the European Commission's health sector
funds in Africa, where disbursements amounted to just
17% of commitments from 1995–2000) [16]. Third,
because the CRS requires donors to report each project's
funding by an "all or nothing" rule, this assigns the whole
of the project's funding to a single CRS category based on
its principal component. This causes mis-reporting where
a single project consists of mixed activities, some part of
which is relevant to malaria, and the rest of which is not.
If that part forms the majority of the project (> 50%), then
the whole project (100%) is reported under one of the six
CRS categories that we screen, leading us to overestimate
those malaria control funds. The converse situation can
also exist, where that part forms the minority of the
project (< 50%), and the whole project is reported under
another category which we do not screen, leading us to
underestimate those funds.
Because donors frequently amalgamate malaria control
into general health systems funding, where it can be a
small part, we believe that the "all or nothing" rule is
likely to cause underestimation more often than overesti-
mation. We, therefore, accept the conservative interpreta-
tion that our CRS-based sums likely understate actual
ODA commitments for malaria control. On the other
hand, actual disbursements to recipient countries will
always be less than the commitments that the CRS
records. For these reasons, we recommend taking the CRS
data as indicative, and not definitive.
Survey Data
In order to improve on the data uncertainties and subjec-
tivity accompanying the CRS data, we distributed a writ-
ten survey to each DAC donor, requesting detailed
information about their funding for malaria control
projects in 2000 (See Additional file: 1 for the original sur-
vey form used to perform this study). Donor agencies
Table 1: CRS Analysis Overview
Broad Sector Purpose 
Code
Sector Description of Sector Dollar Total For 
Category US$ 000 
(grants + conces-
sional and non-con-
cessional loans)
Number of 
Projects
Malaria-related 
projects (see 
text)
Dollar Total For 
Malaria Related 
Projects US$ 
000
Health 12000 General Category 20096 61 3 6051
Basic Health 12200 General Category 7885 22 0 0
12220 Basic health 
care
Basic and primary health care program-
memes; paramedical and nursing care 
programmemes; supply of durgs, medi-
cines, and vaccines related to basic 
health care.
714991 686 3 4398
12230 Basic health 
infrastructure
District-level hospitals, clinics and dis-
pensaries and related medical equip-
ment; excluding specialized hospitals 
and clinics
194473 289 0 0
12250 Infectious 
Disease 
Control
Immunisation; prevention and control 
of malaria, tuberlucosis, diarrhoeal dis-
eases, vector-borne diseases (e.g. river 
blindness and guinea worm)
494971 347 74 39964
12281 Health 
Education 
Control
Information, education and training of 
the population for improving health 
knowledge and practices; public health 
awareness and campaigns
32493 158 3 103
12282 Health 
personnel 
development
Training of health staff for basic health 
care services
205215 125 0 0
Health, 
General
12100 No malaria related projects found in these purpose codes 0
Population 
Policies and 
Reproduc-
tive Health
13000 No malaria related projects found in these purpose codes 0
Totals 1,642,143 1688 83 50516Malaria Journal 2003, 2 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/2/1/8
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were contacted either at the e-mail address officially
lodged with the OECD DAC secretariat, or at an e-mail
address specific to the health programme officer. Donors
who failed to answer the survey received at least two
reminder e-mails between April and December 2001, with
later e-mails employing a return receipt to track (when
technically possible) that they were received and opened.
Where donors cooperated with the survey and furnished
data, we base our conclusions on their responses instead
of the less reliable CRS data previously obtained.
World Bank Data
Because the World Bank has historically been one of the
larger donors for malaria control (larger than all the bilat-
erals combined from 1994–1998), we surveyed its activi-
ties separately. The Bank is also different from bilateral
donors in that it provides loans, which are repayable,
rather than grants, which are not, although the loans that
the poorest countries receive through the Bank's Interna-
tional Development Agency (IDA) bear only token service
charges and no interest. The Bank also sets a positive
example for transparency, and it is the only donor to
maintain a public database with detailed information for
each of its projects. A single link from the Bank's malaria
website returns a list of all malaria-related projects in the
Bank's portfolio, plus background documents for each
[17].
For each of the 16 projects listed on the Bank's malaria
website as of July 2002, we examined up to three different
sorts of Bank background documents – Project Informa-
tion Documents; Staff Assessment Reports; and Project
Appraisal Documents – to ascertain how much of the total
funding for each project was destined for malaria control.
Often this was answerable by a discrete line-item or per-
centage for malaria in the project budget or description
(8/16 projects). Where this did not exist (2/16 projects)
and the project related to several diseases simultaneously
(e.g. a project in Eritrea for HIV/AIDS, malaria, STDs and
TB), we assumed that each disease obtained an equal frac-
tion of the total project value. The remaining projects (6/
16 projects) contained no mention of malaria control
objectives or interventions anywhere in their background
documents, leading us to conclude that the Bank errone-
ously counts these as malaria projects. Where funds were
allocated to malaria control projects over several years, we
Table 2: Bilateral Data Summary – CRS and Survey ($US 000's, 2000)
Country CRS Malaria 
Control Estimate 
[36]
Survey Response Total Malaria 
Funding 
(Survey responses 
used if available)
% of Total Malaria 
Spending
% of GDP Spent on 
Malaria [37]
Australia 133 217 217 0.4% 0.00004%
Austria 0 0 0 0.0% 0.00000%
Belgium 952 Failed To Reply 952 1.7% 0.00035%
Canada 0 Failed to Reply 0 0.0% 0.00000%
Denmark 0 Refused 0 0.0% 0.00000%
Commission of the 
European 
Communities
00 0 0 . 0 %n / a
Finland 0 0 0 0.0% 0.00000%
France 4571 Failed To Reply 4571 8.3% 0.00033%
Germany 1,000 3,000 3,000 5.4% 0.00015%
Greece 0 Failed To Reply 0 0.0% 0.00000%
Ireland 50 250 250 0.5% 0.00023%
Italy 6,500 Failed To Reply 6,500 11.8% 0.00046%
Japan 0 Failed To Reply 0 0.0% 0.00000%
Luxembourg 0 Failed To Reply 0 0.0% 0.00000%
Netherlands 1,860 Failed To Reply 1,860 3.4% 0.00043%
New Zealand 0 Failed to Reply 0 0.0% 0.00000%
Norway 28 0 0 0.0% 0.00000%
Portugal 0 Failed To Reply 0 0.0% 0.00000%
Spain 864 Failed To Reply 864 1.6% 0.00011%
Sweden 0 0 0 0.0% 0.00000%
Switzerland 0 Refused 0 0.0% 0.00000%
United Kingdom 6,000 10,000 10,000 18.1% 0.00070%
United States 28,000 27,000 27,000 48.9% 0.00027%
TOTALS 55214 100% .00023%Malaria Journal 2003, 2 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/2/1/8
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report these funds in the final column of Table 3 as annual
averages.
Levels of Donor Support for Malaria Control
The basic conclusion of our study is this: overall ODA for
malaria control remains extremely low, and incommensu-
rate with the magnitude of the disease. This is true both
for bilateral grants, which we measure at $55.2 million in
new commitments in 2000, and for World Bank conces-
sional loans, which we measure at an annual average of
$43.7 million in commitments for active projects in 2002.
This makes an "annual" total (based on two different data
years) of just $98.9 million in grant and loan assistance
for malaria control. This figure represents our best esti-
mate for the amount of international aid that is available
from all the major aid donors, and is committed to recip-
ients in all parts of the world (excepting the new Global
Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which did not
exist during this research). In relation to the needs
identified elsewhere, it is between 1/15th and 1/25th of the
cost of malaria prevention and treatment worldwide, and
is far from the $1 billion that African Heads of State
requested for RBM in the Abuja Declaration. It is also less
than the $130 million that others have estimated WHO
and bilateral donors would make available by 2002 [18].
We recognize that these figures are alarming and are likely
to attract challenge. We concede that possibly 2000 was
an exceptionally lean year for new malaria control fund-
ing commitments, though this seems unlikely where the
1990s were comparably bad. We also concede that a lim-
itations of the CRS database and its "all or nothing" rule
are such that some spending on malaria control is
certainly invisible in this analysis. This is especially likely
for the European donors, whose support for malaria con-
trol is often subsumed within broader, more "horizontal"
programmes for primary health care. But even allowing
for the (quite remote) possibility that the actual commit-
ments for malaria control could exceed our estimates by
two-fold, the amount of available international aid
finance, particularly as disbursements, would still be
greatly inadequate for RBM's task and the promises made
at Abuja.
It would, of course, be preferable to state our conclusions
without this uncertainty. However, the reason we cannot
do so is often attributable to the bilateral donors
themselves.
Although our data collection methods relied primarily on
CRS data, we tried diligently to improve on this by survey-
ing the bilateral donors directly. This is an unprecedented
step: all previous peer-reviewed studies of this kind are
based solely on CRS data only, but the surprising results
of those data (Table 2) persuaded us to advance the state-
of-the-art and introduce survey methodology [19,20]. Yet
after nine months and several survey requests, only ten of
the 23 bilateral donors agreed to furnish their funding
data, while the other 13 donors – a majority – either failed
to reply or refused outright to provide data. We accord-
ingly were obliged to rely on CRS data in those cases as
past studies have always done [19,20].
Seen in this way, we believe that the neglect of malaria
control possesses two components. The first is, obviously,
a lack of money. But the second is an alarming lack of
transparency and public accountability on the part of
bilateral donors, which causes that neglect to persist.
Bilateral donors are funded purely by public taxes, which
implies an obligation of disclosure to the public of how
aid money is spent. Yet most of the donors in this study
failed to provide data on their malaria control funding
when asked. The reason evidently is that donors often lack
the ability to reply. The Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation answered that it was "not realistic" and "just
impossible" to determine "the amount allocated to
Table 3: World Bank Malaria Projects ($US millions, 2002)
Country Total loan Duration (years) Total malaria component Annual malaria average
Yemen $27.53 5 $2.13 $0.43
Eritrea $40 5 $10 (assumed) $2.00
Solomon Islands $4 5 $1.22 $0.24
Madagascar $40 6 $10.8 $1.80
Comoros $8.4 5 $2.3 $0.46
India $164.8 5 $164.8 $32.96
Senegal $14.9 5 $4.97 $0.99
Cambodia $30.4 5 $3.5 $0.70
Vietnam $101.2 7 $22.7 $3.24
Laos $19.2 7 $5.9 $0.84Malaria Journal 2003, 2 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/2/1/8
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malaria specific interventions", because this amount is
subsumed within general, integrated health programmes,
and because no central repository for budgetary data
exists. To collect those data from the agency's staff around
the world "would take one person...at least 2 full working
weeks", with the probable result that "most [would] say
that they can not make a reasonable guess" about the
actual funding levels.
In short, the Swiss answer, which seems likely to apply to
some other donors too, is that the extent of malaria con-
trol funding is not just unknown, but actually unknowa-
ble. Leaving aside the reasons why this is true (e.g. it is
found in integrated health programmes and not easily dis-
aggregated), this poses a huge strategic threat to RBM's
goals: What is the likelihood of increasing malaria control
funding, when the donors lack the accounting procedures
and ability to know how much they are spending? With-
out reliable financial surveillance, there is good reason to
suspect that aid to malaria control will stagnate, as it has
done for decades, without triggering public pressure to
demand improvement. We note with alarm that nobody
knows – or can know, if they want to – how much of the
$750 million that RBM counted as promises from various
donors after the Abuja Summit has actually been delivered
[21]. If the RBM secretariat is to answer this question
definitively, it must urgently insist that donors in the RBM
partnership participate in routine, transparent, and inde-
pendent financial accounting and auditing, with public
reporting to show if aid funding follows an upward trend.
Some may find it surprising that financial accounting and
independent auditing should become an urgent RBM pri-
ority, when this appears tangential to malaria. The case of
the World Bank illustrates why auditing is crucial.
While the World the Bank deserves praise for its exem-
plary transparency, a close examination of the evidence
shows that it seriously exaggerates its contribution to
malaria control. Although the Bank publicly claims that
"at present, World Bank direct financing for malaria con-
trol activities is over $200 million in more than 25 coun-
tries", we find on the Bank's own project list only 10
countries having "active" malaria control projects [22]. In
India, where in 1997 the Bank pledged its largest malaria
control effort ($164.8 million), the project neared its
close in 2003 after disbursing little over a quarter of this
amount. In Africa, where 90% of malaria deaths occur, the
Bank has only 4 active projects: in the Comoros, Eritrea,
Madagascar, and Senegal. Yet not one of these countries
suffers particularly intense or sustained malaria transmis-
sion – three are hardly malarious at all by African stand-
ards – meaning that the Bank's efforts will contribute little
to halving the burden of malaria.
Worst of all, the Bank has practically reneged on the dra-
matic pledge it made to two dozen African heads of state
at Abuja in April 2000 to provide "up to $500 million
more...for the fight against malaria in Africa" [23]. Nearly
three years after that pledge, Eritrea is the only country to
receive a new loan expressly including malaria control
(the loan package is $40 million, split among 4 diseases).
Assuming that the each disease in the Eritrea loan package
receives an equal share, then the Bank's new lending for
malaria control since Abuja amounts to only $10 million;
and three years after Abuja, up to $490 million of the
$500 million that the Bank promised remains uncommit-
ted and unspent. Furthermore, at this writing (December
2002), the Bank's own malaria project list shows not one
new African malaria control project in the planning pipe-
line. There seems to be no activity underway at the Bank
to keep the promise that was made.
This illustrates why the RBM secretariat must demand rou-
tine and independent auditing of ODA for malaria con-
trol, both to assist donors in improving their procedures,
and if necessary, to enforce accountability. For example,
the Bank could improve its performance by appointing a
"malaria czar" in charge of a new, well funded programme
for African malaria control, exactly as it did for African
HIV/AIDS control. That programme, called ACTafrica, led
to a huge increase in the Bank's HIV/AIDS lending: from
an annual average of $13 million during the 1990s, to
about $500 million in 2002 [24]. A similarly bold deci-
sion is now overdue for malaria, and if the Bank demurs,
WHO must hold the Bank accountable by stripping it of
the "RBM Partner" status – not as punishment, certainly,
but simply to reflect accurately that the Bank has no
efforts underway to deliver the funding it promised at
Abuja.
But assuming that donors lived up to past promises and
made more money available, are their current ways of
doing business suited to the task? Any serious effort to
Roll Back Malaria deaths by half must concentrate over-
whelmingly on Africa, because that is where 90% of
malaria deaths are found. Yet current malaria control
efforts miss that obvious focus. Of the $98.9 million in
donor grants and loans we identify, $37 million, or just
37%, is committed to Africa. Thus whatever criteria
donors apply when selecting countries for aid (an issue
that we asked the 23 bilateral donors in our survey, but
failed to receive a single reply for), disease burden itself is
insufficiently considered.
Certainly, if rich countries sought to control malaria as a
priority, they have abundant financial and political lati-
tude to do so. At $98.9 million, current donor assistance
represents just 0.0004% of DAC countries' gross domestic
product of $24 trillion – or 4¢ on every $10,000 ofMalaria Journal 2003, 2 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/2/1/8
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income in the donor countries [25]. In popular terms, the
Hollywood film, The Titanic, had a production budget
twice as much as the worldwide total of international aid
for malaria control [26]. Even the most meager diversion
of government spending from less important objectives –
for example, the agricultural subsidies in the European
Union, Japan or the United States (at $106 billion, $59
billion, and $95 billion, respectively) – would yield the
$0.5 – 2.5 billion that it costs to save half a million lives a
year [27]. Politically, this has been done before: the
United States under President John F. Kennedy spent bil-
lions on malaria in the 1960s [28].
Institutionally, the new Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculo-
sis and Malaria offers a better mechanism than bilateral or
World Bank aid has in the past. Although the Fund's first
round of grants reveals teething problems, the Fund's core
principle of allocating international aid on the basis of
applications received from developing countries was orig-
inally proposed by one of the authors (Attaran) and con-
tinues to be the most promising approach to aid-giving
[29–31]. Also important are the partnerships that RBM
has forged with pharmaceutical companies and NGOs,
both to supply the latest malaria medicines at not-for-
profit prices to poor countries, and to implement their use
in the field [32,33]. Philanthropies such as the Gates
Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and Wellcome Trust
are also driving important new research, including devel-
opment of malaria medicines and vaccines for the future.
And most importantly, African Heads of State have them-
selves reached a consensus on tackling malaria, though
the median public health budget in sub-Saharan Africa at
just $9 per year (1998 dollars) makes it effectively impos-
sible to do that without outside financial help [34].
Thus a strategy exists; the leaders of malarious countries
have endorsed the goals; and NGO, philanthropic and
corporate contributions are helping to provide the tools.
It is only the international aid donors who are missing, as
we find in this study where 12 of the 22 richest countries
on Earth – including some Group of Seven (G-7) coun-
tries – appear to have not committed one dollar explicitly
to malaria control (subject to the data uncertainties
already discussed).
The reasons for such staggering underinvestment are diffi-
cult to understand. One insight is found in a recent,
revealing study of donors' attitudes, which found that
"funding is not viewed [by donors] as the most funda-
mental obstacle to improved health status."[35]. Instead,
most donors believe that a lack of "absorptive capacity" is
the key constraint in poor countries. As one donor can-
didly stated, sharply increasing aid funds in most African
countries would be tantamount to "pouring water on the
desert".
This contention is equally mistaken as it is contemptuous.
Where absorptive capacity is deficient, finance is the most
essential ingredient to acquire it – as clinics, doctors,
managers, and so on. Donors who complain now about
reaching an impasse because of limited absorptive capac-
ity have themselves to blame for this, because it is hard to
see how capacity in 2003 is any worse than it was in 1998,
when the RBM Partners – i.e. the donors themselves–
decided on the goal of halving malaria deaths by 2010,
with full awareness of the capacity limitations in Africa
The seriousness of the problem we identify necessitates
this blunt, perhaps undiplomatic conclusion: if some aid
donors continue to underspend in coming years and
cause RBM to fail in meeting its goal by 2010, millions of
lives will be lost unnecessarily. Should that occur, the only
"capacity" that must be questioned is that of the donor
agencies to act in accordance with past promises. Politi-
cians will then be correct to demand extreme – even pun-
ishing – scrutiny of the donor agencies involved,
including to hold some leaders personally accountable,
no differently than in other fatal disasters (e.g. an airplane
crash). The donors and the poor with malaria are thus in
this together, and with only 7 years to go, neither has time
to waste.
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